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NOTES
PARENTAL AUTONOMY VERSUS CHILDREN'S HEALTH
RIGHTS: SHOULD PARENTS BE PROHIBITED FROM
SMOKING IN THE PRESENCE OF THEIR CHILDREN?
I. INTRODUCTION
Increased awareness of the dangerous effects of passive smoking' has
led state legislatures, courts, and even private businesses to take action in
an effort to protect the health of non-smokers. Various state and local laws
have been enacted to restrict smoking in public areas.2 Courts also have
acted to try to prevent exposure to passive smoke. Roofeh v. Roofeh3 is
one of the first cases in which a court deciding a matrimonial action
considered the spouse's smoking habit. Since Roofeh, courts have
increasingly examined a child's exposure to smoking as a determinative
factor for denying a parent custody.4 Courts have also allowed employers
to dictate employees' smoking habits in the work place. In Grusendorf v.
City of Oklahoma City,5 a firefighter trainee was fired for smoking on his
1. See CENTERS FOR DIsEAsE CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., THE
HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF INVOLUNTARY SMOKING: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (1986)
[hereinafter THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF INVOLUNTARY SMOKING].
2. See infra note 191.
3. 525 N.Y.S.2d 765 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988). Plaintiff-wife commenced an action for divorce. The
defendant, a physician, sought an order of protection against his wife on the sole ground that she
smoked cigarettes in the presence of the defendant and their children, thus harming them. Id. at 766.
The Supreme Court for Nassau County, New York refused to grant the defendant's request for an order
of protection because such orders, in the court's opinion, were reserved for protecting family members
from domestic violence. Id. at 769. However, the court noted that it had inherent power in matrimonial
matters to issue orders protecting the health and safety of the defendant's children. Id. Thus, the court
issued a temporary order enjoining the plaintiff-wife from smoking in the marital residence and
confining her cigarette smoking to the small television room of the house and only if none of her
children were present in the room. Id.
Since the Roofeh decision, many courts have used smoking as a justification for limiting visitation
rights or awarding custody to the other parent. See, eg., Unger v. Unger, 644 A.2d 691 (N.. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1994). For a general discussion on smoking and custody adjudications, see infra notes 112-
32 and accompanying text; see generally Carolyn J. Wheatley, Note, Should the 1ll Effects of
Environmental Tobacco Smoke Exposure Affect Child-Custody Decisions? 32 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM.
L. 115 (1993-94).
4. See infra part IV.A.
5. 816 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1987).
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lunch break, in violation of the fire department's non-smoking rule.6 The
Tenth Circuit rejected the trainee's constitutional challenge to his
termination.7 In McKinney v. Anderson,8 a prisoner in a Nevada state
prison filed suit against the prison officials, claiming that his exposure to
passive smoking while in prison was a violation of his Eighth Amendment
right against cruel and unusual punishment.9 The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that exposure to smoking constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment in circumstances where an
inmate's health may be harmed."0 Private businesses have also contributed
to the fight against passive smoke; for example, major airlines offer smoke-
free international flights."
Today, the harmful effects of passive smoke, referred to as Environmen-
tal Tobacco Smoke ("ETS"), are widely recognized. 2 Some contemporary
commentators question whether parents should be allowed to smoke in the
presence of their children. 3 Some even argue that a child's exposure to
ETS constitutes child abuse and warrants sanctions such as termination of
parental rights and criminal convictions. 4
Smoking is already regulated in the work place, prisons, and in child
custody cases. This Note argues that smoking should also be regulated in
homes where parents smoke in front of their children, even in the absence
of a custody battle. Such regulation, however, could conflict with not only
parents' rights as individuals to determine their own behavior, but also with
their right to determine how to raise their children. 5
6. Id. at 540, 543.
7. For an explanation of the Grusendorfholding, see infra notes 147-51 and accompanying text.
8. 924 F.2d 1500 (9th Cir. 1991).
9. Id. at 1502.
10. Id. at 1509.
11. See infra note 191.
12. For detailed discussion of ETS, see infra part III and see generally THE HEALTH CONSEQUENC-
ES OF INVOLUNTARY SMOKING, supra note 1, at 7-8 (explaining the various harms caused by ETS).
13. See, e.g., Allison D. Schwartz, Comment, Environmental Tobacco Smoke and Its Effect on
Children: Controlling Smoking in the Home, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 135 (1993).
14. Jon D. Anderson, Parental Smoking: A Form of Child Abuse? 77 MARQ. L. REV. 360, 375-76
(1994); see also David B. Ezra, Sticks and Stones Can Break My Bones, but Tobacco Smoke Can Kill
Me: Can We Protect Children from Parents That Smoke? 13 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REv. 547, 575-86
(1994).
15. The concept of family autonomy refers to parents' control over "private" matters that occur
within the family unit. See Jennifer Trahan, Constitutional Law: Parental Denial of a Child's Medical
Treatment for Religious Reasons, 1989 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 307 (1990). Courts and authors use the
concepts of family autonomy and parental autonomy interchangeably. Id. Raising children in a smoking
environment not only involves personal choices, but also involves parental or family autonomy.
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Part II of this Note examines the evolution of society's attitude towards
children and families. Because our society has come to regard children as
individuals who deserve protection, dignity, and respect, the Supreme Court
has occasionally permitted the law to interfere with family privacy in
situations where a child's welfare is at stake. Although family privacy is
constitutionally protected and parents are, to a degree, free to make any and
all decisions concerning their families, interference with family privacy is
legitimate and constitutional when such decisions harm children.
Part III of this Note demonstrates the dangers of ETS and its harmful
effects on non-smokers, especially children. Therefore, the argument set
forth in Part IV is ineluctable. Based on the criteria set forth in Part II
permitting state intervention in family matters, Part IV argues that states
may constitutionally restrict parents' autonomy and prevent them from
smoking near their children.
Part V concludes that although one could constitutionally restrict parental
smoking under child abuse and neglect statutes, using criminal child abuse
statutes to terminate parental rights is too drastic a solution. An all-or-
nothing approach only substitutes one harm for another. This Note proposes
other solutions to protect children from exposure to ETS at home, such as
parental prevention and treatment programs, orders restraining parents from
smoking near their children, creation of professional duties to report
smoking at home, and fines. 6
II. HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS FROM COLONIAL
TIMES TO THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL CONSECRATION
A. Evolution of Societal Attitudes Toward Children and Emergence of
the Concept of Family Privacy
The notions that parents are not absolutely free to raise their children as
they see fit and that society has a compelling interest in protecting children
against parental abuse are relatively new. An examination of the evolution
of societal views on families and children is critical to understanding why
the Supreme Court protects family privacy under the Constitution, yet
allows states to interfere with family life in certain limited situations.
In early colonial years, American families 7 tended to be rural family
16. See infra part V.B.
17. See generally Judith G. McMullen, Privacy, Family Autonomy, and the Maltreated Child, 75
MARQ. L. REV. 569 (1992) (describing the evolution of the American family from the colonial era to
1996]
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units, in which a child's role was to assist the parents: "[C]hildren faced
severe social and legal restraints ... [and] strict discipline and parental
respect were the hallmarks of child-rearing practices."' 8 Families were
organized according to the same principles of organization that applied to
society at large-Hobbesian authoritarian views of sovereignty and
Puritanical principles emphasizing hierarchical organization and strict
authority.' The parents' responsibility was to ensure that their children
would become productive members of a society in which children were
considered "economic assets."20
Colonial society only interfered with families in order to ensure that
children became productive members of society and not put burdens upon
it.2 For instance, neglected children were taken away from their families
only when it was feared that such children would become delinquents.22
However, unless a child's condition posed a risk to society as a whole,
courts would not interfere with family decisions.23 Maximum parental
authority was perceived as necessary to maintaining an orderly society.
A radical change occurred during the nineteenth century: the family unit
migrated from rural to urban areas, and factories replaced the household or
family farm as the primary unit of economic production.24 This new
separation between work and home forced society to regard the family
home as a shelter or refuge, out of society's reach.' Children were no
longer considered economic assets, but individuals.26 The parents' primary
role was to educate their children and inculcate sound values and
principles.27 As the notion that child-rearing and family relationships were
present times).
18. SANDRA STENCEL, EDITORIAL RESEARCH REPORTS ON THE CHANGING AMERICAN FAMILY 12-
13 (1979).
19. Lee E. Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1135, 1139.
20. STENCAL, supra note 18, at 12.
21. McMullen, supra note 17, at 573-74.
22. Id. at 574. For the same reason, state officials would also take away poor children and place
them in apprenticeships. LAURENCE D. HOULGATE, THE CHILD AND THE STATE, 23 (1980) (citing
Harold Goldstein, Child Labor in America's History, 30 CHILDREN TODAY 5 (1976)). For example,
under a 1646 Virginia law, county commissioners were required to send poor children over six or seven
years old to work in the public flax houses in Jamestown. Id. See generally SOPHONISBA P.
BRECKENRIDGE, THE FAMILY AND THE STATE: SELECT DOCUMENTS 344 (1934).
23. McMullen, supra note 17, at 575.
24. Teitelbaum, supra note 19, at 1140-41.
25. Id. at 1141.
26. Id. at 1143.
27. Id.
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part of a "private sphere' ' emerged, society began to believe that the
family was not a proper area for government intervention.29
Concomitant to recognizing that families were part of a "private sphere,"
society also came to recognize that parents were not absolutely free to raise
their children without some restrictions. States began to impose limits on
family autonomy through neglect and delinquency statutes.30 Courts
primarily upheld these statutes by invoking the parens patriae power of the
state.31 Parens patriae is defined as the state's power to protect and
promote the welfare of individuals who lack the capacity to act in their
own best interest, such as children or mental incompetents.32
Because most neglect and delinquency statutes, as originally enacted,
were vague, judges often resorted to using subjective standards, to determine
28. MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA 14 (1985).
29. See McMullen, supra note 17, at 577. The concept of family autonomy emerged in a social
atmosphere where government's interference witn individual choices was generally regarded as evil:
"[L]eaving people to themselves is always better... than controlling them." JOHN STUART MILL, ON
LIBERTY 97 (C. Shields ed., 1956), quoted in Bruce J. Winick, On Autonomy: Legal and Psychological
Perspectives, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1705, 1712 (1992).
30. The affair that prompted the enactment of child abuse and neglect legislation is the famous
1874 case of Mary Ellen. See Maijorie R. Freiman, Note, Unequal and Inadequate Protection Under
the Law: State ChildAbuse Statutes, 50 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 243, 244 nn.6-11 (1982). The child, Mary
Ellen, was subjected to daily beatings and other forms of abuse by her stepparents. A social worker
sought to intervene, but discovered that no laws existed allowing intervention in family matters to
protect battered children. HOULGATE, supra note 22, at xi. The social worker was forced to resort to
the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, which successfully prosecuted the parents under
the existing cruelty to animals laws. They prevailed on the grounds that children are an animal species,
possessing the right to be free from cruelty. Id. The publicity of the Marie Ellen affair prompted many
states to enact laws regulating child abuse and neglect. Id.
31. Courts could also use the state police power to justify interferences with family autonomy. See
Ernest Gellhorn, Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156,
1198 (1980) (book review). Under the police power, the state has plenary power to promote the health,
safety, morals and general welfare of its citizens. Id. at 1198-99. Thus, if an individual's conduct
endangers any of these interests, the state may intervene under the police power. The parens patriae
power, however, is designed to protect the welfare of individuals as opposed to society. Id. at 1199.
Thus the state may intervene even when there is no possibility of harm to public welfare. Id. Generally,
courts invoke the state'sparenspatriae power rather than the state's police power to uphold child abuse
or neglect legislation. Id. at 1221.
32. Id. at 1199. The state's parenspatriae power originated as an equitable concept in the English
chancery courts. Id. at 1221. The courts permitted a chancellor to act as "general guardian of all infants,
idiots, and lunatics." Id. at 1221-22. Initially, the chancellors only used their power when property was
at issue and the child lacked a natural guardian. Id. at 1222 n.153. Eventually, the English courts began
to use their parens patriae power to protect children in other situations, e.g., to protect children from
"grossly immoral or heretical parents." Id. at 1222.
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whether state intervention was justified.33 As a result, even though society
considered the home an inviolable sanctuary, nineteenth century courts
allowed states to intervene in family life fairly frequently.34 During the
twentieth century, however, the Supreme Court extended constitutional
protection to family privacy, and, in a long line of cases, severely limited
the states' power to interfere with parental autonomy.35
B. Constitutional Protection of Family Autonomy
The constitutional protection of family privacy originated in Meyer v.
Nebraska.36 In Meyer, the Court invalidated a statute that in effect
prohibited parents from teaching their children foreign languages before the
child finished eighth grade.37 The Court held that the statute unreasonably
interfered with parental autonomy and violated the Due Process Clause
because the word "liberty," found in the Fourteenth Amendment, grants
parents the right to "establish a home and bring up children."3 Thus, the
Court recognized that parents have certain fundamental rights in determin-
ing how to raise their children.39 Because the Court did not believe that
the state had a sufficiently compelling interest that outweighed the parents'
right to direct their child's upbringing, the Court concluded that the statute
was unconstitutional.4" However, the Supreme Court suggested that had
the State demonstrated that teaching foreign languages harmed children's
33. Id. at 1224.
34. Id. at 1221-27.
35. The Supreme Court has constitutionally protected parental autonomy under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See infra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
36. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
37. Id. at 396-97. The Nebraska Act read: "Languages, other than the English language, may be
taught as languages only after a pupil shall have attained and successfully passed the eighth grade as
evidenced by a certificate of graduation issued by the county superintendent of the county in which the
child resides." Id. at 397 (quoting 1919 Neb. Laws ch. 249).
38. Id. at 399.
39. Id. at 401.
40. Id. at 403. The state asserted that the legislation was valid because its purpose was to "promote
civic development by inhibiting training and education of the immature in foreign tongues and ideals
before they could learn English and acquire American ideals . I... Id. at 401. The Court declared that
the state could go "very far" in order to improve the quality of its citizens. However, the Court noted
the state also had to respect individuals' fundamental rights. Id. The Court noted that Plato's Ideal
Commonwealth, where children would be taken from their families and raised by Sparta, was
inconsistent with the American tradition of parental autonomy, and thus with the Constitution. Id. at
401-02. The Court concluded that the only way that state interference with parental autonomy could
survive a constitutional challenge was if knowledge of a foreign language clearly harmed the child's
health or morals. Id. at 403. Because the state could not make such a showing, the Court concluded that
the statute was invalid. Id.
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health, the state's interference would have been justified.4'
Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of
Jesus and Mary,42 the Supreme Court invalidated a state statute requiring
parents to send children between ages eight and sixteen to public
schools. 43 The State had attempted to compel general attendance at public
schools. 44 The Court recognized that requiring children to attend schools
was a valid state interest.45 However, the statute, in effect, precluded
parents from sending their children to religious schools. Because religious
schools were not "unfit" for or "harmful" to children,46 the Court found
that the statute unreasonably interfered "with the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their
control. 47
In Prince v. Massachusetts,48 the Supreme Court held that the guardian
of a child had violated a Massachusetts child-labor law by allowing the
child to sell religious literature on the streets.49 The Court, in accord with
Meyer and Pierce, acknowledged that there is a private realm of family life
into which the state could not enter.5" However, the Court also recognized
that family life is not beyond all forms of regulation.5 The Court declared
that state intervention into family privacy and parental autonomy is
constitutionally permissible if the challenged statute is designed to prevent
harm to the child and the statute is a necessary means to accomplish that
objective.52 Because "propagandizing the community"'53 could be physi-
41. Id. at 403. "No emergency has arisen which renders knowledge by a child of some language
other than English so clearly harmfiul as to justify its inhibition with the consequent infringement of
rights long freely enjoyed." Id. "[E]xperience shows that [proficiency in a foreign language] is not
injurious to the health... of the ordinary child." Id.
42. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
43. Id. at 530.
44. Id. at 531.
45. The Court expressly declared that "[n]o question is raised concerning the power of the State
reasonably to regulate all schools.. . [and] to require that all children ofproper age attend some school
' .Id. at 534.
46. On the contrary, the Court noted that sending children to religious schools was both
encouraged and meritorious. Id. at 534.
47. Id. at 534-35.
48. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 166.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 166-69.
53. The court considered that "propagandizing the community," i.e., street preaching (whether oral
or by handing out leaflets), created situations that were difficult for adults to cope with and a fortiori
for children of tender years. Id. at 169.
2291996]
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cally and emotionally harmful to children, the Court upheld the statute."
Thus, Prince stands for the proposition that whenever parents' actions or
decisions threaten to harm their children, states may interfere with family
autonomy.
The Court refined the Prince holding in Wisconsin v. Yoder.55 In Yoder,
an Amish couple refused to comply with a state statute requiring children
to attend secondary school.56 The State of Wisconsin asserted that under
the parens patriae doctrine, it had the power to require children to attend
secondary schools in situations where the parents refused to voluntarily
send them." The Court again recognized that the state may only interfere
with parents' decisions regarding a child's upbringing if the state can show
that the parents' conduct or decisions will somehow "jeopardize the health
or safety of the child, or have a potential for significant social burdens."58
Finding no showing of harm to the children,59 the Court concluded that
the state's interest in requiring a few more years of education did not
outweigh the parents' interest in raising their children according to Amish
customs.6" Accordingly, the Court ruled in favor of the parents.6
The Supreme Court's rulings in Meyer, Pierce, Prince, and Yoder 2
indicate that the Court is generally reluctant to allow state intervention in
the private sphere of family life. The Supreme Court generally recognizes
parents as the uncontested authorities of the home, except when their
decisions harm their children. Thus, where parental decisions are likely to
harm their children, the Court believes that the state has a "compelling
54. Id. at 169-70.
55. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
56. Id. at 207-08 n.2. The Wisconsin statute provided that "any person having under his control
a child who is between the ages of seven and sixteen years shall cause such child to attend school
regularly." Id. (citing Wis. STAT. § 118.15 (1969)).
57. Id. at 229.
58. Id. at 234. The Court, reiterated that "the power of the parent ... may be subject to limitation
under Prince...," and noted that the state might have had a compelling interest justifying intervention
if the record had demonstratively shown that forgoing one or two years of school damaged the children
or otherwise "materially detract[ed]" from the welfare of society. Id. at 233-34.
59. An expert witness for the Amish couple asserted that compulsory high school attendance could
result in great psychological harm to Amish children because modem high schools impart values
contrary to those espoused by the Amish. Thus, compulsory secondary school attendance might
ultimately prevent the Amish children from integrating into both the Amish community and
contemporary society. Id. at 211-13.
60. Id. at 234.
61. Id. at 234-36.
62. Meyer, 262 U.S. 390; Pierce, 268 U.S. 510; Prince, 321 U.S. 158; Yoder, 406 U.S. 205.
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interest'  in protecting the children, which gives the state the power to
limit a parent's authority." Therefore, to determine whether state regula-
tions restricting parental smoking in the presence of their children are
constitutional, it is necessary to first examine the dangers of smoking and
whether passive smoking actually harms children.
III. THE DANGERS OF ETS FOR CHILDREN 65
Tobacco smoke contains approximately 4,000 chemical components,66
forty-three of which are carcinogens67 and two hundred of which are
known poisons.68 Tobacco smoking6 9 is one of the major public health
hazards in the United States today,7 ° causing an estimated 434,000 deaths
63. The Court's decisions show that the state always has a compelling interest where it intervenes
to protect children from parental conduct that threatens their physical or mental health. See, e.g., Yoder,
406 U.S. at 234 (invalidating Wisconsin statute requiring all children to attend secondary school because
foregoing continued education did not harm them and, in fact, prepared them for Amish life); Prince,
321 U.S. 158, 170 (upholding a statute prohibiting children from selling magazines in public places
because of possible harmful physical and emotional consequences associated with that activity); Meyer,
262 U.S. 390, 403 (holding that the state had not established a legitimate interest warranting
intervention because the state statute which required learning a foreign language was in fact beneficial
to children); see also Oldfield v. Benavidez, 867 P.2d 1167, 1173 (N.M. 1994) (citing Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982)).
64. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166-67.
65. Schwartz, supra note 13; Wheatley, supra note 3; Anderson, supra note 14.
66. AM. LUNG ASS'N, LEAFLET No. 0006, FACTS ABOUT SECOND-HAND SMOKE (1992)
[hereinafter FACTS ABOUT SECOND-HAND SMOKE].
67. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REDUCING THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF
SMOKING, 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 21 (1989).
68. FACTS ABOUT SECOND-HAND SMOKE, supra note 66, at 1. Tobacco smoke not only contains
nicotine, which is poisonous and addictive, but also cyanide, ammonia, acetone and poisonous gases
such as nitrogen oxide and carbon monoxide. AM. CANCER SOC'Y, LEAFLET No. 2023-LE, THE MOST
OFTEN ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT SMOKING, TOBACCO, AND HEALTH AND... THE ANSWERS, questions
3 & 9 (1993) [hereinafter QUESTIONS ABOUT SMOKING].
69. Tobacco smoking not only designates cigarette smoking, but also includes cigar and pipe
smoking. FACTS ABOUT SECOND-HAND SMOKE, supra note 66, at 1. Because it is virtually impossible
to avoid inhaling tobacco smoke totally, even smokers who do not inhale-generally cigar and pipe
smokers-increase their risk of lung cancer. See QUESTIONS ABOUT SMOKING, supra note 68, question
11. Smokers are also at an increased risk for contracting lip, mouth, and tongue cancer. Id. Neither
chewing tobacco nor snuff are safe alternatives to smoking. Id. question 32. Smokeless tobacco actually
contains even more cancer-causing substances (known as nitrosamines) than smoking tobacco does. Id.
In fact, some smokeless tobacco brands contain up to 20,000 times the legal limit of nitrosamines
permitted in various foods and consumer products. Id.
70. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NAT'L INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, CLINICAL
OPPORTUNITIES FOR SMOKING INTERVENTION: A GUIDE FOR THE BUSY PHYSICIAN 2 (NIH Publication
No. 92-2178, reprinted 1992).
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annually.
1
Over thirty years have passed since tobacco smoking was first officially
recognized as a primary cause of many deaths and diseases.72 Since then,
our knowledge of the lethal effects of tobacco smoking has continued to
grow. In addition to lung cancer, there are at least seven other kinds of
cancer related to smoking.73 Tobacco smoke also increases the risk of
heart disease74 and is the major cause of chronic obstructive pulmonary
diseases, which are often fatal.75
Non-smokers are also affected by tobacco smoking when they are
exposed to so-called passive smoking, also commonly known as ETS or
second-hand smoke.76 ETS is a combination of mainstream smoke exhaled
by the smoker, and sidestream smoke emitted from the tip of a burning
cigarette." Cigarettes, when not inhaled, bum at a lower temperature than
sidestream smoke.7" Sidestream smoke, which results from the combustion
of the cigarette at lower temperature, contains larger amounts of harmful
components than mainstream smoke.79 Sidestream smoke is more toxic
than mainstream smoke because the mainstream smoker receives the
benefit of both a filter and a higher burning temperature. 0 In 1992, the
71. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, RESPIRATORY HEALTH EFFECTS OF PASSIVE SMOKING:
FACT SHEET 1 (1993) [hereinafter EPA FACT SHEET].
72. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT ON THE HEALTH
CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING (1964).
73. QUESTIONS ABOUT SMOKING, supra note 68, question 4. Smoking increases the risk of cancer
of the oral cavity, the esophagus, the larynx, the bladder, the kidney, the pancreas, and the uterine
cervix. Id. See also AM. LUNG ASS'N, LEAFLET No. 0588, WHAT You SHOULD KNOW ABOUT
SMOKING AND CANCER, 6-9 (1991); A Smoking Gun, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 31, 1994, at 61A.
74. QUESTIONS ABOUT SMOKING, supra note 68, question 12. "Medical authorities believe that
CO [carbon monoxide], like nicotine, plays an important role in increasing smokers' risk of heart
disease and stroke." Id. question 10. "Nicotine causes blood pressure to go up and increases heart rate
by as much as 33 beats per minute." Id. question 3. Carbon monoxide displaces large amounts of
oxygen from the red blood cells, thus depriving the body of oxygen by making it harder for the oxygen
to get to muscles and organs. Id. question 10.
75. QUESTIONS ABOUT SMOKING, supra note 68, question 7. "Chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease (COPD), which includes chronic bronchitis and emphysema, kills about 81,000 people each
year, cigarette smoking is responsible for 65,000 or approximately 80% to 90% of these deaths." Id.
76. Id. question 24. See also AMERICAN CANCER SOC'Y, CANCER RESPONSE SYSTEM,
ENVIRONMENTALTOBACCO SMOKE, view 2604 (1993) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTALTOBACCO SMOKE].
77. QUESTIONS ABOUT SMOKING, supra note 68, question 24. "When a cigarette is smoked, about
one-half of the smoke generated is side stream smoke emitted from the burning cigarette between
puffs." Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. AM. LUNG ASS'N, WHAT EVERYONE SHOULD KNOW ABOUT SMOKING IN THE WORKPLACE
5 (1994) [hereinafter SMOKING IN THE WORKPLACE]. "When a smoker inhales, oxygen "fans" the fire
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol74/iss1/6
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Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") released a report8 concluding
that ETS should be classified as a group A carcinogen82 (i.e., known to
cause cancer in humans) along with arsenic and asbestos.83
In the United States, one half of all children under five years of age have
been exposed to cigarette smoke and more than a quarter of all young
children are exposed to passive smoke both before and after birth.84 The
effects of ETS on children are diverse and acute." The most serious effect
of a child's exposure to ETS, however, is a greatly increased risk of lung
cancer.
8 6
and tobacco buns more cleanly." 1d. Because sidestream smoke bums more slowly it is less clean and
contains more poison. Id. Sidestream smoke is also worse than mainstream smoke, which is partially
cleaned by the filter and unburned tobacco because it goes directly into the air. Id. According to the
American Lung Association, sidestream smoke contains twice as much nicotine, five times as much
carbon monoxide, two times as much tar, seventy-three times as much ammonia, three times as much
benzopyrene, and more cadmium than mainstream smoke. Id at 4.
81. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, PUB. No. 006F, RESPIRATORY HEALTH EFFECTS OF
PASSIVE SMOKING: LUNG CANCER AND OTHER DISORDERS (1992) [hereinafter PASSIVE SMOKING
REPORT]. The report indicates that "ETS is ... responsible for approximately 3,000 lung cancer deaths
annually in U.S. non-smokers." Id. at 1-1. The number of lung cancer deaths caused by ETS annually
has been estimated at 4,000 deaths per year, almost three percent of all annual lung cancer deaths.
AMERICAN CANCER SOC'Y, LEAFLET No. 2060, THE SMOKE AROUND You: THE RISKS OF
INVOLUNTARY SMOKING (1992) [hereinafter RISKS OF INVOLUNTARY SMOKING]; see also Health Effects
of Passive Smoking; Assessment of Lung Cancer in Adults and Respiratory Disorders in Children;
External Review Draft, 55 Fed. Reg. 25,874 (1990). For a list of other diseases associated with ETS,
see infra notes 86-98 and accompanying text.
82. EPA FACT SHEET, supra note 71, at 3.
83. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, METHODOLOGY FOR EVALUATING POTENTIAL
CARCINOGENICITY IN SUPPORT OF REPORTABLE QUANTITY ADJUSTMENTS PURSUANT TO CERCLA
SECTION 102 (1988), cited in MeKinney v. Anderson, 924 F.2d 1500, 1506-07 (9th Cir. 1991). The
EPA carcinogen classification consists of the following: Group A, known human carcinogens; Group
B, probable human carcinogens; Group C, possible human carcinogens; Group D, agents that are
unclassifiable as to human carcinogenicity; Group E, agents for which there is evidence supporting that
they are noncarcinogens for humans. Id. Other than ETS, Group A carcinogens also include arsenic,
asbestos, benzene, chromium compounds, and vinyl chloride. Id.
84. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HHS NEWS, June 18, 1991, at I [hereinafter HHS
NEWS].
85. Id. "[Ijn households with current smokers, 4.1% of children-well over a quarter of a million
children five years old or younger-were in fair or poor health compared to 2.4% of children in
households where no one smoked and 3.5% in families where smokers quit." Id. A study lead by the
Centers for Disease Control's National Center for Health Statistics found that children in households
with smokers were generally in poorer health than children in families where no one has ever smoked.
86. Dwight T. Janerich et al., Lung Cancer and Exposure to Tobacco Smoke in the Household,
323 NEw. ENG. J. MED. 632 (1990). In that study the authors found that "[h]ousehold exposure to 25
or more smoker-years [determined by multiplying the number of years in the household by the number
of smokers in the household] during childhood and adolescence doubled the risk of lung cancer." Id.
at 632. The authors concluded that high levels of exposure to tobacco smoke during childhood and teen
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Aside from lung cancer, ETS is also the cause of various other health
problems in children exposed to parental smoking. 7 The 1992 EPA
report,s reviewing previous studies, 9 indicates that children and infants
exposed to ETS from parental smoking have significantly higher rates of
respiratory disorders than those not exposed to ETS.9" The report, based
on the overall results of several epidemiological studies,9 shows that
parental smoking, especially by the mother, correlates with detrimental
respiratory effects in children.92 These effects are so diverse and severe
that they are listed specifically in order to make the reader fully understand
the consequences of ETS on children. Symptoms include respiratory
irritation, such as coughing, wheezing,93 or the production of sputum;94
acute diseases in the lower respiratory tract, such as pneumonia or
bronchitis, which often require hospitalization;95 acute and chronic middle
ear infections, predominantly middle ear effusion, the most common reason
years account for approximately 17% of lung cancer among non-smokers. Id.
87. PASSIVE SMOKING REPORT, supra note 81, at 1-12 to 1-16.
88. Id.
89. ENVIRONMENTAL TOBACCO SMOKE, supra note 76, view 2605.
90. PASSIVE SMOKING REPORT, supra note 81, at 1-1.
91. Id. at 1-7. To a certain degree, epidemiological studies are imprecise. The only way to
irrefutably demonstrate the link between second-hand smoke and respiratory diseases would be to
expose a large amount of people to second-hand smoke for various years. Second-Hand Smoke: Is it
a Hazard?, CONSUMER RPT., Jan. 1995, at 27-33. Such an experiment is obviously impossible to
conduct. However, because "different investigators, using different definitions and study designs" have
all reached similar conclusions, the results of epidemiological studies are the most accurate available
evidence on second-hand smoke. Id. The EPA considered other factors that might have played a role
in causing respiratory diseases when it reviewed the available evidence between ETS exposure and other
non-cancer respiratory diseases examined in the report. PASSIVE SMOKING REPORT, supra note 81, at
1-15. For example, the EPA carefully examined factors including: "indoor air pollutants; socioeconomic
status; effect of parental symptoms; and characteristics of the exposed child, such as low birthweight
or active smoking." Id. The EPA nevertheless concluded that no single factor nor combination thereof
could explain the respiratory conditions observed in children exposed to passive smoking. Id.
92. PASSIVE SMOKING REPORT, supra note 81, at 1-15.
93. Id. at 1-13. Wheezing is defined as "breathing with difficulty, producing a hoarse whistling
sound." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 775 (3d ed. 1993).
94. PASSIVE SMOKING REPORT, supra note 81, at 1-13. Sputum is defined as "[e]xpectorated
matter including saliva and substances from the respiratory tract." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE
DICTIONARY 662 (3d ed. 1993).
95. The EPA report indicates that evidence from studies reporting a significant association between
parental smoking and acute lower respiratory tract illness leads to the conclusion that parental smoking
increases the risk of lower respiratory tract infections in young children and infants within the first 18
months to three years of life. PASSIVE SMOKING REPORT, supra note 81, at 1-14. Exposure to ETS
contributes to the 150,000 to 300,000 annual cases of lower respiratory tract infections in that age
group. Id. at 1-16. Between 7,500 and 15,000 of these cases require hospitalization. Id.
234
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol74/iss1/6
1996] PARENTS' SMOKING AND CHILDREN'S RIGHTS
for hospitalization and surgery on young children;96 reduced lung func-
tion;9 7 exacerbated symptoms in asthmatics;9" and acute and frequent
colds and sore throats."
The above findings corroborate the previous conclusions of the 1986
Report of the Surgeon General, which linked exposure to ETS with
respiratory illnesses and reduced pulmonary output functions.i"e The 1992
EPA Report also reviews new studies linking parental smoking to the
induction of asthma and to increases in the number and severity of asthma
attacks in children.' Additionally, the report reviewed, for the first time,
data on the relationship between maternal smoking and sudden infant death
syndrome ("SIDS"), which is thought to be caused by an unknown
respiratory condition."
In the United States, SIDS kills more than 5,000 infants per year and is
the main cause of death in infants between the ages of one month and one
year. 3 The 1992 report concludes that a clear connection between deaths
from SIDS and smoking mothers exists."' Not only are children exposed
96. Id. at 1-14.
97. Id. Until the 1992 EPA report, medical authorities were unsure whether the decreases in tests
of pulmonary output function in children of parents who smoke were caused by the direct action of
agents in ETS or whether they were consequences of respiratory illnesses caused by ETS. Id. The EPA
report indicates a causal rather than indirect relationship between ETS and reduced lung functions in
children. Id.
98. EPA FACT SHEET, supra note 71, at 2-3. The report indicates that ETS worsens the condition
of 200,000 to over one million asthmatic children and causes new cases of asthma in previously non-
asthmatic children. Id.
99. PASSIVE SMOKINo REPORT, supra note 81, at 1-13.
100. The 1986 report of the Surgeon General had previously concluded that respiratory symptoms
such as irritation and lower respiratory tract infections are more frequent and acute in children whose
parents smoke. THE HEALTH CONSEQuENCES OF INVOLUNTARY SMOKING, supra note 1, at 37. The EPA
reviewed 18 new studies on respiratory symptoms and 10 new studies on acute lower respiratory tract
illnesses and confirmed the Surgeon General's 1986 report. PASSIVE SMOKING REPORT, supra note 81,
at 1-13 to 1-14.
101. PASSIVE SMOKING REPORT, supra note 81, at 1-14. Based on several studies, the EPA
estimated that children's exposure to ETS caused by a mother smoking 10 or more cigarettes per day
is responsible for 8,000 to 26,000 cases of childhood asthma per year. Id. at 1-15. However, if
additional cases with less ETS exposure are included, the number of cases ranges from 13,000 to 60,000
per year. Id. Overall, the "impact of ETS on asthmatic children includes more than 200,000 children
whose symptoms are significantly aggravated and as many as 1,000,000 children who are affected to
some degree." Id. at 1-15. These figures correlate with "20% of this country's 2 million to 5 million
asthmatic children and is a major aggravating factor in approximately 10%." Id. at 1-5.
102. Id. at 1-6.
103. Id. at 1-15. See also ENVIRONMENTAL TOBACCO SMOKE, supra note 76, view 2605.
104. PASSIVE SMOKING REPORT, supra note 81, at 1-6. However, available studies do not disclose
"whether and to what extent this connection is related to in utero versus postnatal exposure to tobacco
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to ETS in the womb and in early infancy at an increased risk of dying from
SIDS, but they are also more likely to suffer from lower respiratory tract
infections and alterations of lung functions that predispose them to long
term pulmonary risks. 5
Other harms associated with ETS exposure are cardiovascular problems,
heart disease, and death. 06 Medical researchers indicate that non-smokers
experience an increased risk of contracting heart disease when exposed to
other people's smoke:0 7 "[T]his includes people who have no say in the
matter, such as children whose parents smoke."' '1
In view of all of the harms ETS causes to children's health, the need to
eliminate ETS from the homes of children is obvious t0 9 Moreover, the
effects of involuntary smoking on children whose parents smoke continues
beyond the early years. Just as battered children are far more likely to
become abusive,"0 children who grow up with smokers are more likely
to become smokers themselves."t
smoke products'" Id. Thus, the EPA could not assert whether "ETS exposure [after birth] is by itself
a risk factor for SIDS independent of smoking during pregnancy." Id.
105. ENVIRONMENTALTOBAcCo SMOKE, supra note 76, view 2605. Smoking during pregnancy also
retards a baby's growth. Studies indicate that seven-year old children whose mothers smoked heavily
during pregnancy, were "shorter in stature, had slower reading abilities and lower ratings on social
adjustments than children of non-smoking mothers." See AM. CANCER SOc'Y, LEAFLEr NO. 2740,
CANCER RESPONSE SYSTEM, SMOKING AND PREGNANCY, (1993). See also AM. CANCER Soc'Y
LEAFLET, NO. 2717, WHY START LIFE UNDER A CLOUD (1992); AM. LUNG ASS'N, LEAFLET NO. 0176,
FACTS ABOUT SMOKING AND PREGNANCY, at 6 (1992).
106. Aubrey Taylor et al., Environmental Tobacco Smoke and Cardiovascular Disease: A Position
Paper from the Cardiopulmonary and Critical Care Council of the American Heart Association, 86
CIRCULATION 699 (1992).-
107. The increased risk of death from heart disease is about 30% among those exposed to ETS at
home. Id.
108. Aubrey E. Taylor, Ph.D., Professor and Chairman of Physiology at the University of South
Alabama, Remarks at a News Conference Co-sponsored by the American Heart Association, the
American Lung Association, and the American Cancer Society (June 10, 1992).
109. ENVIRONMENTAL TOBACCO SMOKE, supra note 76, view 2605.
110. One might object that this is an unnecessarily inflammatory assertion. However, in terms of
physical harm, there is arguably no difference between battering a child and smoking in front of a child.
Both types of behavior can lead to the child's death. Even former United States Surgeon General C.
Everett Koop has compared smoking near children to child abuse. See Wheatley, supra note 3, at 115,
111. AM. CANCER SOC'Y, LEAFLET No. 2719, Qurr SMOKING ... THE LivES You SAVE COULD
BE THEIRS (1993) [hereinafter QUIT SMOKING]. Statistics indicate that children of parents who smoke
are "twice as likely to smoke" as children of parents who do not smoke. Id.
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IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RESTRICTING PARENTAL SMOKING IN
THE PRESENCE OF THEIR CHILDREN
A. Court Action in Custody Cases
Many courts dealing with custody cases have restricted parents from
smoking in the presence of their children. Following the precedent set in
Roofeh v. Roofeh,"' several courts have considered parents' smoking
habits when evaluating custody decisions. For instance, in Badeaux v.
Badeaux, a couple's twenty-month old child had bronchial problems
and endured repeated upper-respiratory infections." 4 The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision to limit
the father's visitation privileges." 5 The appellate court specifically
articulated that one of the reasons it limited the father's visitation rights
was the detrimental effects the father's cigarette smoking had on the child's
health. '1
6
Not only do courts consider smoking when restricting or conditioning
visitation rights, but they also use smoking as a factor to decide which
parent should be awarded custody. In Pizzitola v. Pizzitola,"7 the jury's
decision to deny a mother custody was partly based on evidence that the
child was allergic to smoke and that the mother smoked in the child's
presence."' In Mitchell v. Mitchell, 9 the Court of Appeals for the
Middle Section of Tennessee affirmed the trial court's decision not to
award custody to a mother on the grounds that the mother and grandmother
continued to smoke in the presence of the child 2 ° after a physician had
warned them that it aggravated the child's asthmatic condition.' The
112. 525 N.Y.S.2d 765 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988).
113. 541 So. 2d 301 (La. Ct. App. 1989).
114. Id. at 302.
115. Id. at 303.
116. Id. at 302-03. Because the father stayed with his mother and stepfather, who also smoked, the
child's exposure to ETS during the visits was greatly increased. Id.
117. 748 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
118. Id. at 569.
119. No. 01-A-01902CV00442, 1991 WL 63674 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 1991).
120. Id. at *1. The trial court noted that both the mother and grandmother admitted to smoking near
the child, even in enclosed and poorly ventilated areas such as their car. Id.
121. The fact that the mother and the grandmother chose to continue smoking, despite a physician's
recommendation that they quit for the sake of the child's health, was, in the eyes of the trial judge,
"strong evidence of a lack of proper concern for the welfare of the child." Id. at *4.
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court found that granting custody to the father was in the child's best
interest." The court also affirmed the lower court's decision to condition
the mother's visitation fights on assurances that the mother and grandmoth-
er not smoke in the presence of the child and take all acts necessary to
dissipate any lingering smoke before the child's arrival.
Custody and visitation rights involving no-smoking conditions are now
commonly imposed in custody orders. In Unger v. Unger, 4 the Superior
Court of New Jersey, pending a final resolution of the custody matter,
prohibited a mother from smoking in her home or in her vehicle when her
children were present.' Moreover, the court ordered her to ensure that
there was no ETS in her home or vehicle for a period of ten hours prior to
the children's presence. 6 The court rejected Mrs. Unger's argument that
regulating the presence of ETS in the air might open a "floodgate" of
litigation. 27 The court noted that it did not prohibit Mrs. Unger from
smoking, but limited the times and places where she could smoke, 28 and
insisted that it could impose sanctions if she violated their order.2 9
Similarly, in De Beni Souza v. Kallweit,3 ° the Superior Court of
Sacramento County, California ordered a mother to refrain from smoking
in the presence of her child.'31 The court was addressing the parents'
claim for modification of their custody and visitation rights. The father had
requested that the child's health be protected from the effects of the
mother's smoking habits. The court granted the request, and issued " a
directive from the bench banning smoking by the mother in the direct
presence of the child within the home."'' 2 These decisions explicitly
recognize that ETS impairs the health and safety of children.
122. Id.
123. Id. at *2.
124. 644 A.2d 691 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1994).
125. Id. at 695.
126. Id. at 693. Expert testimony indicated that ventilators "do not completely eliminate the dangers
of ETS," and "in an ordinary ventilated area," smoke takes eight to ten hours to dissipate. Id.
127. Id. at 696 (citing Falzone v. Busch, 214 A.2d 12, 16 (NJ. 1965)).
128. Id. at 693. The court indicated that in her place of employment, Mrs. Unger's smoking was
already restricted to certain areas. Id.
129. Id. at 696. The court indicated that violations could be detected by Mr. Unger. Id.
130. No. 807516, Slip op. (Cal. Super. Ct. Sacramento County Aug. 4, 1990), cited In 16 FAM. L,
REP. 1496 (1990) (Bureau of National Affairs) (legislative notes).
131. Id.
132. Id.
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B. Restricting Parental Smoking in Non-Custody Cases: Permissible
State Interference with Parental Autonomy
As illustrated above, courts have gone as far as prohibiting parents from
smoking in front of their children.'33 This shows that courts are aware of
the dangers of ETS and are willing to take action to protect children from
these dangers. However, interference with family privacy in the context of
divorce is not subject to the same restraints as interference with family
privacy when the family is intact. Courts can tell parents how to behave
with respect to their children in the divorce context because those parents
have specifically asked the state to arbitrate their dispute. Could similar
interventions occur in non-divorce situations without constituting an
impermissible intrusion into the "private realm"'34 of the family?
Even though courts are deferential to parental autonomy, 35 the
Supreme Court decisions in Meyer, Pierce, Prince and Yoder136 indicate
that state intervention is permissible when parents' decisions are likely to
have a harmful impact on their children. 37 Although the Fourteenth
Amendment protects the "fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in
the care, custody, and management of their children,"' 38 the Supreme
Court has been willing to uphold state intervention to prevent harm to
children under two conditions. First, the state's interest in the child's
welfare must be sufficiently compelling 39  to outweigh parents'
133. Courts may even go as far as to refuse to grant custody to a smoker who may otherwise be
a loving and affectionate parent. In Badeaux, for instance, the trial judge noted "the love and affection
of the father for his son." 541 So.2d at 302. Nevertheless, the trial judge, whose decision was confirmed
on appeal, held that the father's smoking was a sufficient reason to limit his visitation rights. Id. at 302-
03.
134. The Supreme Court recently repeated that there is a "private realm of family life which the
state cannot enter." Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2807 (1992)
(quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
135. McMullen, supra note 17, at 585-96. Judith McMullen argues that such deference is based on
two questionable assumptions: that respect for parental choices is necessary for a child's healthy
development and that parents can be trusted to act in the best interest of their children. Id. According
to McMullen, there is no clear evidence showing that state intervention harms children. Id. at 588.
Moreover, McMullen asserts that good parenting is not instinctive and that parents may be unable to
assess the best interests of their children. Id. at 592.
136. Meyer, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Prince, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
137. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's view on state intervention, see supra part II.B.
138. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
139. The reason the state has a compelling interest in the welfare of children is explained in Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944). "It is the interest of youth itself, and of the whole
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rights.14  Second, the state's means must be narrowly tailored to the
interest asserted.'
4 1
An abundance of evidence indicates that ETS actually harms children
and that the harm inflicted is often deadly.44 Thus, when a state acts to
protect children against exposure to ETS, it asserts a traditionally
compelling state interest: protecting children from physical harm.'
Moreover, prohibiting parents from smoking in the presence of their
children is arguably the least restrictive means available to ensure that the
child will become a healthy adult. Evidence shows that even smoking a few
cigarettes in the presence of children directly endangers their health by
exposing them to ETS,'" and indirectly by encouraging them to begin
community, that children be . . . given opportunities for growth into free and independent well-
developed men and citizens." Id.
140. For a demonstration of how the Supreme Court has consistently interpreted harm to children
as a sufficiently compelling state interest that clearly outweighs parents' rights, see supra note 63 and
accompanying text.
141. The Supreme Court will uphold a state statute interfering with family autonomy only if the
state can show that the statute was reasonably related to "some purpose within the competency of state."
Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters of the Holy Name of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923). Additionally, the Court requires that the statute be tightly drawn
to the compelling purpose in order to be valid. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 189 (1986); see also
Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977).
142. For a discussion of ETS's deadly consequences, see supra part III.
143. States have a compelling interest in protecting children's welfare and ensuring society that
once they become adults, they will not be a burden on society. See supra note 139. If children are
harmed or unhealthy because they have been exposed to ETS, they may be unable to discharge the
duties and responsibilities of citizens and will unduly tax the resources of society. This idea carries
some weight when one considers the enormous social and monetary burdens smoking puts on society.
For example, smokers miss 32% more work days than non-smokers. AM. LUNG ASS'N, LEAFLET NO,
0930, QUESTIONS AND ANswERs ABOUT SMOKING AND HEALTH (1992). Although the tobacco industry
is very profitable, the societal costs of smoking represent approximately twice the profits of cigarette
sales. QUESTIONS ABOUT SMOKING, supra note 68, question 31. These costs have prompted states to
enact new laws and sue tobacco companies, holding them liable for smoking related health-care costs
paid by taxpayers. William Booth, Chiles Signs Law That Would Allow Florida to Sue Cigarette
Makers, WASH. POST, May 28, 1994, at A3. In Florida, these costs have reached at least $1.2 billion
in Medicaid payments over the past five years. Id. Similar laws and lawsuits have been instituted in
Mississippi and Minnesota and are being contemplated in Maryland and Massachusetts. See generally,
Joseph Menn, Tobacco Firms Sued by Mississippi, PHIL. INQUIRER, July 1, 1994, at C2; Gorden Slovut,
State, Blue Cross Sue Tobacco Industry: Seek Reimbursement for Treating Illnesses, STAR TRIBUNE
(Minneapolis), Aug. 18, 1994, at Al; Liz Spayd, Md. May Sue Tobacco Firms Over Health: State
Would Seek to Recoup Cost of Treating Smoking-Related Ills, WASH. POST, July 7, 1994, at MI; Doris
S. Wong, Rider Would Let AG Sue Tobacco Firms for Health Costs, BOSTON GLOBE, July 8, 1994, at
Al. Nationally, smoking-related illnesses cost the United States about $50 billion a year. Ron Scherer,
More States Plan to Sue for Costs of Smoking, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, July 12, 1994, at 6.
144. ETS contains more harmful substances than mainstream smoke, so that smoking even a few
cigarettes produces dangerous amounts of harmful chemicals. For a discussion of how side stream
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smoking later in life. 45 Therefore, it seems that states and courts may be
able to constitutionally prohibit parents from smoking in their children's
presence even in the absence of divorce proceedings.
However, parents who smoke could argue that even if a prohibition on
smoking is a valid interference with parental autonomy, it is nevertheless
an invalid infringement of their fundamental right to liberty. Although the
Fourteenth Amendment does not expressly protect the right to smoke, the
right to smoke may be inferred from the right to liberty, privacy, or the
right to be let alone, which are all constitutionally protected rights. 46
In Grusendorfv. City of Oklahoma City,47 a firefighter trainee asserted
this argument, claiming that a regulation prohibiting him from smoking on
and off duty constituted a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment
rights.148 The Grusendorf court presumed that the non-smoking regulation
restricted a liberty interest protected by the Constitution. 149 The court
nevertheless upheld the prohibition on smoking because the state's interest
in the good health of its firefighters outweighed the individual liberty
interest to smoke on and off duty for a year. 50 Noting the Supreme
Court's reluctance to "discover new fundamental rights," the Grusendorf
court merely presumed that "a liberty interest" was implicated; the court
smoke is more dangerous than mainstream smoke, see generally SMOKING IN THE WORKPLACE, supra
note 80.
145. For a discussion of how parental smoking influences children, see supra notes 110-11. Most
teenagers start smoking "because it is the accepted thing to do, because adults or friends smoke, to try
to express independence, or to try to act mature." QUIT SMOKING, supra note 111. Studies show that
if children "grow up to smoke cigarettes at the current adult rate, then at least 5 million of them will
die from smoking-related diseases." QUESTIONS ABOUT SMOKING, supra note 68, question 29.
146. In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court acknowledged that various constitutional
provisions create liberty rights that are not spelled out in the text of the Constitution, but are contained
in the "penumbra" of other provisions. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The Supreme
Court has consistently recognized the fundamental right to privacy. See, e.g., Lanza v. New York, 370
U.S. 139 (1962); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Frank v. Maryland 359 U.S. 360 (1959); Pub.
Util. Comm'n. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952); Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). See also William M. Beaney, The Constitutional Right to
Privacy in the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 212. The Court even recognized the right to be let
alone. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). See also Erwin N. Griswold, The Right to Be
Let Alone, 55 Nw. U.L. REV. 216 (1960).
147. 816 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1987)
148. Id. at 540.
149. Id. at 543.
150. Id. at 543. The court noted that the state government had a "heightened interest" in regulating
firefighters because it acted as their employer. Id. The court only examined whether the state purpose
was legitimate and whether a rational connection between regulating the firefighters and the state
purpose existed. Id. Because good health and physical fitness are prerequisites for being a firefighter
the court found the regulation valid. Id.
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did not declare the right to smoke a fundamental right.'
But even if one were to argue that the right to smoke is implicitly
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and recognized as a fundamental
right, it is not rendered immune from state intervention. A state may
constitutionally intrude upon a fundamental right, regardless of whether it
is parental autonomy or a personal right to liberty, so long as it demon-
strates a compelling state interest and the requisite connection between the
means employed and the ends achieved. 52 Protecting children and
assuring that they develop into healthy adults and responsible citizens is a
compelling state interest.' Given the pervasive dangers of ETS, only a
total prohibition on parental smoking in the presence of their children can
achieve such an end. 54
Another objection that smokers might raise is that prohibiting parents
from smoking in enclosed areas in the presence of their children would, in
effect, deny them the right to do what they please in their own homes.'55
Contrary to the belief that such a restriction is constitutionally impermissi-
ble as an unwarranted invasion of privacy, conduct that occurs in the home
is. not necessarily out of state reach merely because it takes place in the
home.'56 States and courts frequently interfere with conduct that takes
place inside the home, for instance in child abuse cases.15 7 Courts even
prohibit parents from engaging in conduct inside the home that is otherwise
legal. 8 Professor Banzhaf'59 points out that courts have gone as far as
terminating parental rights when parents drink excessively, 160 when the
151. Id. at 543 & n.3 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986)).
152. Once the Supreme Court recognizes a particular right as a constitutional liberty interest
protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court then considers the
importance of the state's interests and the extent to which the statute reflects and serves the purpose
asserted. See Moore v. City of Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977).
153. For a discussion of why states have a compelling interest in protecting children, see supra note
139.
154. For an explanation of the dangers of side stream smoke, see SMOKING IN THE WORKPLACE,
supra note 80.
155. This Note not only recommends that parents be prohibited from smoking at home, but also
that they be prohibited from smoking in front of their children in any enclosed area.
156. Wheatly, supra note 3, at 130.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Telephone Interview with ProfessorJohn F. Banzhaf, III, Executive Director and Chief Counsel
for Action on Smoking and Health and Professor of Law at George Washington University in
Washington, D.C. (Dec. 16, 1994).
160. In Re Christopher S., 1992 WL 43234 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1992). The court's decision to
terminate the father's parental rights was based on the fact that he was a chronic alcoholic. Id. at *10.
[VOL. 74:223
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol74/iss1/6
1996] PARENTS' SMOKING AND CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 243
children and the house are not clean, 61 and even when parents exhibit
improper sexual behavior in front of their children. 62 Thus, there is little
support for the claim that courts, through state statutes, may not constitu-
tionally prohibit parents from smoking at home in the presence of their
children. t63
Prohibiting parents from smoking in their children's presence should be
constitutionally permissible. Such a conclusion should not be surprising. If
a state statute prohibited parents from administering arsenic to their
children, or from exposing them to asbestos,"u the Court would certainly
uphold the statute as constitutional. 6 As a matter of fact, courts routinely
convict parents who have administered poisonous drugs to their chil-
See also Snipes v. State Dep't of Human Resources, 542 So. 2d 282, 284 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989)
(ordering termination of parental rights where evidence indicated that the mother had an extreme alcohol
abuse problem); Wood v. State Dep't of Human Resources, 523 So. 2d 129, 130 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988)
(ordering termination of parental rights where parents had a history of marital and employment
instability and alcohol abuse).
161. State v. M.L.S., 348 N.W.2d 138 (Neb. 1984). In M.L.S., the Nebraska Supreme Court
affirmed a lower court's order, terminating the mother's parental rights. Id. Finding evidence that the
children were habitually filthy, that the home was infested with roaches, that garbage was stored in the
house, and that there was frequently no heat despite evidence of adequate income to pay bills, the court
terminated the mother's parental rights. Id. at 139-40. See also Knott v. Tippecanoe County Dep't of
Pub. Welfare, 632 N.E.2d 752,756 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that termination of parental rights was
in the best interest of the children because the home was filthy and unsafe); J.L.L v. Dep't of Pub.
Welfare, 628 N.E.2d. 1223, 1227 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (affirming an order terminating both parents'
parental rights because the children were filthy and the house unclean).
162. In one case, the Supreme Court of Nebraska held that evidence of the mother's alcohol
addiction and explicit sexual habits justified the termination of her parental rights. State v. N.H., 467
N.W.2d 682, 687 (Neb. 1991). See also In Re Young, 342 So. 2d 1205, 1207 (La. Ct. App. 1977)
(affirming the trial judge's order terminating parental rights based on evidence that the children were
improperly subjected to viewing sexual activity at home).
163. Interview with Barbara Flagg, Professor of Law at Washington University School of Law, in
Saint Louis, MO (Jan. 12, 1995). Professor Flagg believes that competing values are at stake. On the
one hand, the child's health must be considered. On the other hand, one must respect privacy in the
home. If ETS in fact seriously harms children, the state's interest may very well outweigh the concern
with privacy in the home. Thus, restricting parental smoking at home would be constitutional. Id.
164. Both arsenic and asbestos are group A carcinogens. For a list of EPA classifications, see supra
note 83.
165. Cf People v. Vandiver, 283 N.E.2d 681 (Ill. 1971). In Vandiver, the Supreme Court of Illinois
upheld the constitutionality of an Illinois child abuse statute, which states that parents are guilty of child
abuse if they "willfully cause or permit ... the health of [a] child to be injured." Id. at 683 (citing ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 23, para. 2354 (Smith-Hurd 1969)). This type of statute is more vague than a statute
specifically prohibiting parents from exposing their children to arsenic or asbestos. By analogy, if the
Illinois statute is constitutional, a more specific statute prohibiting parents from poisoning their children
through exposure to arsenic or asbestos should be constitutional as well.
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dren. 66 Thus, if states and courts can reach the behavior of parents who
expose their children to poisonous substances, there is no reason why states
and courts should not be able to prohibit parents from exposing their
children to ETS. One could reject this conclusion on the belief that ETS is
not as dangerous as arsenic. However, it bears repeating that an overwhelm-
ing number of scientific studies have established that ETS, like arsenic,
causes death. Aside from the fact that smoking generally causes death
over a longer period of time, 6 the only difference between poisoning
one's child and exposing a child to smoking is that one behav-
ior-smoking-is socially acceptable, while the other-giving arsenic-is
not. Social bias should not stop states and courts from intervening when
children's health and the future of our society 6 9 are at stake.
V. PROPOSED FORMS OF" INTERVENTION TO RESTRICT PARENTAL
SMOKING
A. The Use of Child Abuse and Neglect Statutes
If states can constitutionally prevent parents from smoking in front of
their children, the next question that arises is what form such intervention
may take. One possibility is the use of child abuse and neglect statutes.
This Note only examines whether civil, not criminal, child abuse or neglect
statutes could be used to prevent parents from smoking in front of their
children. Authors' who argue that parents should be criminally convict-
ed, even in limited situations,' appear to misunderstand the issue at
166. For example, in State v. Hofford, the Superior Court of New Jersey criminally convicted the
defendants, husband andwife, under a child abuse statute for intentionally administering dangerous
controlled substances to their twin daughters. 377 A.2d 962 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1977). Similarly, in People
v. Bergerson, the Supreme Court of New York ruled that the defendant violated a criminal child abuse
statute by encouraging 16 year old youths to drink alcohol. 218 N.E.2d 288 (N.Y. 1966). Although
these convictions occurred in the criminal context, similar results could be attained under civil statutes.
167. See supra part III.
168. Smoking one cigarette will not cause immediate death, but it greatly increases the risk of
death, so that in certain cases, depending on the duration and intensity of smoking, death is almost
inelectable. In the case of lung cancer for instance, a person who started smoking at age 13 may only
develop lung cancer at age 50. But the risk at age 50 for the person who started smoking at age 13 is
350% greater than for a 50 year old who started smoking at age 23. PREVENTING TOBACCO USE
AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE, REPORT OF THE U.S. SURGEON GENERAL 2a (1994).
169. See supra note 139.
170. See generally Anderson, supra note 14; Ezra, supra note 14.
171. See, e.g., Ezra, supra note 14. Professor Ezra recognizes that the state should only criminally
convict parents who smoke under the most egregious circumstances. Id. Thus, he proposes the use of
criminal abuse or neglect statutes only after analyzing four factors: the child's health, where the
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stake. The focus of this Note is to try to find a way to protect children. A
child's best interest is not always served by punishing parents, taking away
a parent's custody or depriving the child of the parental relationship."
Statutes that address child abuse and neglect broadly define the terms
"neglect" and "abuse." In the case of neglect,'73 various states define the
term as the failure of the child's guardian to give the child proper care and
attention under circumstances indicating that the child's health or welfare
is significantly harmed or at risk of being significantly harmed. 74 The
definition of neglect in state statutes thus seems to require two elements:
harm and negligent treatment.'75 In light of the evidence showing that
ETS harms children, 76 smoking in front of one's child should at least
constitute neglect under state statutes that define neglect as "harm caused
through negligent treatment" or "failure to provide proper care under
circumstances that indicate that the child's health is significantly
harmed."'177
As explained in Part III of this Note, ETS causes actual harm to children.
Given the increased awareness of the dangers of ETS, one who exposes his
or her children to such dangers fails to provide the requisite care. One
custody case, Mitchell v. Mitchell,178 confirms the idea that exposing
one's child to ETS constitutes negligent treatment. The Mitchell court
indicated that parental smoking, after the child's physician had recommend-
smoking occurs, the amount of smoking, and finally, the history of the particular case.
172. Civil statutes are primarily concerned with children's welfare and their protection. See ALAsKA
STAT. § 47.17.010 (Michie 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.50I(l) (West 1993); GA. CODE. ANN. § 19-
7-5(a) (Michie 1993); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-702 (Michie 1984).
Criminal statutes, on the other hand, emphasize punishment. See generally 22 CJ.S. Criminal Law
§ 3 (1989). Parental behavior may, on occasion, appear to deserve punishment. For example, if a parent
of a child in poor health keeps smoking, despite the parent's awareness that smoking aggravates the
child's condition, punishment may be warranted. See, e.g., Badeaux v. Badeaux, 541 So. 2d 301,302-03
(La. Ct. App. 1989); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 1991 WL 63674, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). However, a
child's best interest is not necessarily served when parents are punished and custody is taken away from
them. Thus, this Note attempts to find alternative methods of eliminating the source of the harm. For
existing and possible alternatives, see infra notes 197-210 and accompanying text.
173. For an analysis of abuse statutes, see infra notes 180-87 and accompanying text.
174. See, e.g., MD. CODE. ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-701(g) (Michie 1984). Michigan law defines
neglect as "harm or threatened harm to a child's health.., by a parent... which occurs through...
negligent treatment, including the failure to provide adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical care."
MItCH. CoMp. LAWS § 722.622(d) (West 1979). See also ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.290(10) (Michie 1990).
175. Id.
176. For a discussion of the harms caused by ETS, see supra part III.
177. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.290(10) (Michie 1990); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-701(g)
(Michie 1984); MICH. CoMp. LAwS § 722.622(d) (West 1979).
178. 1991 WL 63674 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).
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ed against it, indicated a lack of proper concern for the welfare of the
child.' 79
Additionally, parental smoking could constitute abuse under existing state
statutes. State statutes defining abuse fall into two categories. The first
category focuses on acts that endanger the health of children. For instance,
the Illinois statute prohibiting child endangerment provides:
It is unlawful for any person to willfully cause or permit the life or health
of a child under the age of 18 to be endangered or to willfully cause or
permit a child to be placed in circumstances that endanger the child's life or
health. 80
Thus, under this first category of statutes' any harm, whether latent or
patent, if willfully caused, constitutes child abuse.' Even though its
effects on children are not immediate, ETS clearly causes a child's health
to be endangered; thus, passive smoking could constitute abuse under this
first category.
The second category of statutes focuses on physical injuries purposely
inflicted upon a child by a parent or caretaker. 82 The injury requirement
would seem to imply either a physical wound or a bruise. However, these
statutes do not define injury.183 Thus, under principles of statutory
construction one must turn to the common definition of the term "injury"
which is "damage or harm."' 4 Therefore, for purposes of these statutes,
ETS could constitute a "physical injury" because even though its effects are
neither immediate nor visible, ETS physically harms children.
Regardless of whether a the child abuse statute defines harm as
endangerment or as physical injury, both types of abuse require intent-that
179. Id.
180. 720 ILCS 5/11-17 (west 1994).
181. The Minnesota child abuse statute provides an example of a statute in which the harm that
constitutes abuse is not specified. MNN. STAT. ANN. § 609.378(2)(b)(1) (West Supp. 1993). Under
Minnesota law, abuse occurs when a parent "endangers the child's person or health by ... intentionally
or recklessly causing or permitting a child to be placed in a situation likely to substantially harm the
child's physical or mental health .... Id.
182. Delaware defines child abuse as "the physical injury by other than accidental means, injury
resulting in a mental or emotional condition which is a result of abuse or neglect, negligent treatment,
sexual abuse, maltreatment, mistreatment, nontreatment, exploitation or abandonment, of a child under
the age of 18"' DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 902 (Michie 1993); see also COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-
401(1) (West 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-5(b)(3)(A) (Michie 1993); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW
§ 5-901(b)(1) (Michie 1984).
183. Id.
184. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 359 (3d ed. 1993)
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the harm be willfully inflicted.' Some commentators argue that cigarette
smoking is an intentional infliction of harm. 86 If a parent smokes and is
aware that smoking subjects the child to respiratory diseases, lung cancers,
and cardio-vascular diseases, the parent is knowingly harming the
child. 7 Thus, it appears that states could intervene in family matters and
prevent parents from smoking in front of their children under existing child
abuse and neglect laws without constitutional obstacles.
However, because smoking tobacco remains socially acceptable and a
large number of Americans still smoke,' 8 there would surely be strong
societal resistance to such forms of intervention. Society as a whole does
not perceive smoking to be the type of behavior that courts should prohibit
under the rubric of child abuse or neglect.'89 This misconception may
exist because smoking cigarettes does not always pose an immediate or
visible harm to non-smokers. Cigarette smoking may also occur in homes
where parents are misinformed or refuse to take health information
seriously, but are otherwise loving and caring parents. tg However, in
recent decades, the rising movement against smoking has prompted the
185. Some states, such as Maryland, require a heightened degree of intent. MD. CODE. ANN., FAM.
LAW § 5-901(b)(1) (Michie 1984). Under Maryland law, abuse is "the sustaining of physical injury by
a child as a result of cruel or inhumane treatment or as a result of a malicious act by any parent or
caretaker ... " Id.
186. See supra note 14.
187. This argument has been developed in the context of prosecution under criminal child abuse
statutes. See Anderson, supra note 14, at 376-80. Frequently, a parent who is aware of the dangers of
smoking continues to smoke. See Badeaux v. Badeaux, 541 So. 2d 301, 302-03 (La. Ct. App. 1989);
Mitchell v. Mitchell, 1991 WL 63674 (Tenn. App. 1991).
188. See QUESTIONS ABOUT SMOKING, supra note 68, question 33. People began to realize the
dangers of smoking 30 years ago when the Surgeon General began to issue health warnings on packs
of cigarettes. Id. question 30. Another reason why the public chose to ignore smoke's harmful effects
is that tobacco revenues were perceived as a benefit to the American economy. Id. question 33. It is
clear, however, that any revenue tobacco generates cannot compensate for the greater health and social
burden it places on our society. Id. In 1985, cigarette sales procured $32 billion in revenue for the
American economy. Id. question 31. However, the Office of Technology Assessment estimated that the
total yearly economic loss due to smoking, including Medicare-Medicaid costs and lost earnings due
to early death and diseases, could reach $65 billion. Id. The cost of smoking has led many states to sue
tobacco companies for reimbursement for the tremendous Medicaid and Medicare health-costs that they
incur annually to treat smoking-related illnesses. For a list of the various states that are either suing
tobacco companies or contemplating doing so, see supra note 143. If cigarettes were introduced today,
based on the current medical knowledge concerning the dangers of smoking, there is no doubt that its
use would be banned. QUESTIONS ABOUT SMOKING, supra note 68, question 33.
189. See id.
190. Some studies show that children whose parents smoke may suffer emotional consequences
manifesting in anxiety over their parents' premature death. See Anderson, supra note 14, at 368.
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enactment of legislation protecting non-smokers. 9 ' Additionally, people's
attitudes towards smoking have changed." Smoking is no longer as
socially acceptable as it once was. Parents who continue to smoke in front
of their children have less of an excuse than they did ten years ago. There
is no objective reason why state intervention in the name of protecting
children from exposure to ETS in the home should encounter social
resistance.
B. Enforcing Prohibitions on Parental Smokng
Resistance to state restrictions on smoking in the home may be
exacerbated by the fact that those who advocate treating parental smoking
as a form of child abuse propose extreme solutions. For example, some
advocates for state intervention have proposed terminating parental
rights,t93 thereby coercively intervening just as the state does in cases of
191. Although tobacco is still legal, many laws restrict its use. Congress banned television and radio
advertising of cigarettes in 1970. 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1994). Not only has Congress banned smoking
aboard domestic flights under six hours, but many federal workplaces are smoke-free environments.
QUESTIONs ABOUT SMOKING, supra note 68, question 30. "As of 1993, forty-eight states and
Washington D.C. had passed laws banning the sale of cigarettes to minors." Id. Moreover, in most
states, there is a minimum legal age to purchase tobacco products, which varies between sixteen and
nineteen. Id. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.641 (West 1993) (setting minimum age at 18).
"As of 1990, smoking laws in 45 states, Washington, D.C. and 480 municipalities restrict smoking in
public places." RISKS OF INVOLUNTARY SMOKING, supra note 81. The private sector has also taken
measures to restrict smoking. United Airlines in Chicago announced that it would add three more
smokeless international flights to the daily smoke-free flights. Stanley Ziemba & George Gunset, AMA
on Tobacco Attack Calls Cigarettes a Drug, CH. TRIB., June 8, 1994, at I.
192. Some recent government figures, however, are worrisome. They indicate that smoking among
young people may be increasing. Approximately 28% of high school seniors say they smoke and that
girls smoke as much as boys. Deborah Sharp, Fired-up Florida Governor Takes on Tobacco Giants:
New Law Would Allow State to Sue Firms for Smokers' Care, USA TODAY, June 6, 1994, at 13A.
Some authors argue that smoking is unacceptable social conduct, which should be eliminated because
smokers do not have a moral right to smoke. Keith Butler, The Moral Status of Smoking, 19 Soc.
THEORY & PRAC. 1 (1993). Dr. Butler invites us to consider the difference between shooting someone
and being shot. Id. at 2. A, the shooter, has done something to P, the person who has been shot. With
respect to the shooting, A is active and P is passive. Id. A may have the right to discharge firearms.
However, where A aims the bullet at P, A's right becomes limited. Id. at 3. The right to take action
exists as long as exercising that right does not infringe upon the right of another to be free from harm.
Id. By analogy, Dr. Butler argues, "the right to smoke persists only so long as the act, smoking, does
not conflict with the more basic right of nonsmokers to be free from harm." Id. at 6. If nonsmokers are
harmed by the presence of smoke, smokers, who are causing harm, must refrain from smoking. Id. The
inconvenience to smokers, which smokers claim is a harm to them, "is asymmetrically related to the
harm czused to nonsmokers." Id. In effect, "it is the smokers who are doing something to the
nonsmokers, while the reverse is not true." Id.
193. For a discussion of how exposing children to ETS constitutes child abuse and how state
intervention is a socially acceptable solution to certain forms of child abuse, see Anderson, supra note
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drug and alcohol abuse. 94 However, those holding such views appear to
be more concerned with "punishing" parents rather than protecting the
child." 5 Preserving a child's physical health at the expense of a child's
mental health and emotional stability is a drastic measure that makes little
sense.
196
In order to gain adequate protection from ETS, children do not have to
sacrifice either their health or their emotional well-being; the state can
intervene in family matters to protect a child's health without resorting to
draconian measures. In substance abuse cases, commentators have insisted
on implementing prevention and treatment programs. 197 Some states
already provide prevention programs in child abuse cases. 198 States could
use prevention and training programs similar to those designed for physical,
sexual, drug or alcohol abuse, to deal with parents' nicotine addiction.199
Additionally, the state could provide children and parents with information
in locations such as schools. Such information could address the problems
associated with smoking and provide possible solutions to help smokers
quit.200
14, at 367-76.
194. See Janet L. Dolgin, The Law's Response to Parental Alcohol and "Crack" Abuse, 56 BROOK.
L. REV. 1213 (1991); Anderson, supra note 14, at 383. See also Schwartz, supra note 13.
195. Child abuse and neglect statutes generally define abuse or neglect solely in terms of parental
conduct. Michael S. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: A Search for Realistic
Standards, 27 STAN. L. REv. 985, 1000-04 (1975). Typically, abuse is defined as non-accidental
physical injury to the child by a parent and neglect is defined as the parent's failure to provide proper
care. For a list of statutes and definitions, see supra part V.A. The problem with laws that define abuse
and neglect in terms of parental behavior is that they only permit state intervention when the parent's
conduct conforms or not with what the law proscribes as illegal, regardless of whether or not the child
actually needs protection from her parents. Wald, supra, at 1002-03.
196. Except in cases where a child is seriously harmed, coercive intervention is unlikely to improve
a child's situation and may actually put the child in a more detrimental situation, particularly when the
child is placed in an institution or a foster home. Wald, supra note 195, at 993-1000. Because the
government is incapable of meeting a child's emotional needs, coercive intervention should be the
exception rather than the rule. See Wald, supra note 195, at 993-1000. (1986). Removing a child may
be the most painful thing to do in this type of situation and may cause the most serious psychological
damage to the child. Id. at 993-94. Moreover, institutions and foster homes are often ill-suited to the
child's needs. Id. at 994. This situation is frequently aggravated when children are moved from one
foster family to another. Id.
197. For an examination of alternative solutions to removing a child from home, see Dolgin, supra
note 194, at 1213, 1262-66.
198. See, e.g., FLA STAT. ANN. § 415. 501 (West 1993).
199. See, e.g., FLA STAT. ANN. § 415. 5015(3)(c) (West 1993).
200. The broad range of existing programs designed to help smokers quit include self help
programs, such as freedom from smoking guides, audio tapes designed by the American Lung
Association, and expert-led group sessions offered by the Young Men's Clubs of America and local
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Under current state statutes, courts have jurisdiction over abused or
neglected children and over any other adult living in the same home.2 1'
Courts usually have various options when a child requires protection,
including restraining the abusive party from committing further acts of
abuse. 22 Theoretically, courts could order parents to refrain from smok-
ing in front of their children.2 3 A willful violation of such an order
would constitute an act in contempt of court, punishable by fine.2°
Some claim that even if the state could intervene to prohibit parents from
smoking at home in the presence of their children, as a practical matter,
such regulation would not effectively control smoking because of
enforcement problems.0 One author argues that the only effective way
to monitor domestic smoking is to subject children who live with smokers
to random blood, urine, or saliva tests to detect nicotine.20 6 Such interven-
tions would be too intrusive, too disruptive, impossible to organize, and
would surely face challenges on constitutional grounds.20 7
Those who advocate this position fail to see that there are other methods
of monitoring smoking at home. Less restrictive and equally efficient
solutions are available. Physicians, for instance; are in a privileged position
to determine whether children are being subjected to ETS. In the same way
that the physician has a duty to report episodes of abuse,2" 8 a physician
who reasonably suspects that a child is exposed to parental smoking at
home might have a duty to report the case to social services or other
agencies. These agencies would then conduct an investigation. Upon a
finding that the parent smokes in front of the child, these agencies would
have the authority to impose fines, require the parent to smoke only in one
hospitals.
201. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.12 (West 1987).
202. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.191(1b) (West 1992).
203. Such orders already exist in custody cases. See, e.g., De Beni Souza v. Kallweit, No. 807516
(Cal. Super. Ct. Sacramento County Aug. 4, 1990); Unger v. Unger, 644 A.2d 691 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1994); Strahman v. Foster, No. 4663-A-1990 (Ct. of Common Pleas, Erie County, Pa. Mar. 21,
1991); Mitchell v. Mitchell, No. 01-A-01902CV00442, 1991 WVL 63674 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 1991).
204. For an exemplary list of penalties for willful violation of a court order under Oklahoma law,
see OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1122 (west 1987).
205. See Schwartz, supra note 13, at 171.
206. Id. at 170.
207. Id.
208. See, e.g., GA. CODE. ANN. § 19-7-5(c)(1)(A) (Michie 1995); MICH, COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 722.623(1) (West 1993); MD. CODE. ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-903(a) (Michie 1984).
(VOL. 74:223
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol74/iss1/6
PARENTS' SMOKING AND CHILDREN'S RIGHTS
area of the house,2" and recommend counseling programs. Such an
investigation would be particularly appropriate in cases of asthmatic
children because it could save the child's life.
Although the actual enforcement of legislation that restricts smoking at
home may be problematic, difficulty of enforcement is an insufficient
reason for failing to sanction certain types of conduct. Regulating adults'
actual intake of controlled substances is very difficult. Such difficulty,
however, does not justify a lack of legislation on the use of drugs.
Similarly, we should not ignore the problem of parental smoking because
it cannot be fully prevented.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is well established that children have rights,21 ° and the scope of these
rights continues to expand.2" Article 24 of the Convention on the Rights
of the Child recognizes a child's right to enjoy the highest attainable
standard of health.2"2
Opponents of state intervention restricting smoking at home continue to
espouse the myth of total family autonomy2 3 to justify prohibiting the
state from restricting parental smoking. However, the Supreme Court has
consistently reiterated that parental autonomy gives way to state interven-
tion when children are actually harmed by their parents' decisions. Smoking
actually harms children. The only reason why society perceives state
intervention in this domain as an impermissible intrusion is because society
does not fully comprehend the deadly consequences of smoking.2 4
The same arguments set forth fifty years ago to prevent the state from
intervening in child abuse cases2 5 are being used again to prevent the
state from intervening to restrict smoking at home. The Supreme Court,
however, clearly indicated that "parents may be free to become martyrs
209. In divorce cases, courts have already restricted parents to smoking in one area of the home.
Roafeh v. Roofeh, 525 N.Y.S.2d 765, 769 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988).
210. HOULGATE, supra note 22, at 17-32.
211. Id. at 33-44.
212. On November 20, 1989, the United Nations adopted the Convention on the Rights of the
Child. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1448. To this date, however,
the United States has failed to sign it.
213. See McMullen, supra note 17, at 596-98. Professor McMullen explains that deference to
parental autonomy rests on false presumptions, erroneously rejects state intervention, and allows parents
to maltreat children. Id.
214. For a discussion of how cigarettes, if introduced today, would be banned, see supra note 188.
215. See Wheatley, supra note 3, at 129.
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themselves. But it does not follow that they are free.., to make martyrs
of their children. ' 16 Parents who smoke not only engage in a "bad
habit," but engage in destructive behavior that at best handicaps their
children for life and at worst leads to their deaths. In light of the obvious
dangers of smoking, society is well advised to take measures to ensure that
children do not suffer anymore harmful consequences of their parents'
decision to smoke.
Mireille 0. Butler
216. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944).
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